When managing a baseball team, a manager has to decide how to run the offense. In a prior post, I gave a little bit of an overview of two major offensive strategies: big ball and small ball. Big ball is an offensive strategy where the team depends on big hits and a few innings where multiple runs are scored. Stolen bases, sacrifices, and strategic outs are not major parts of this type of strategy; rather a team will forgo a seemingly more sure single run to go for a curvy number on the scoreboard.
In small ball, however a team will go for the more certain single run over the chance of getting more runs in an inning. A team that uses this strategy will use sacrifices, stolen bases, and strategic outs to score a runner on base instead of depending on solid hits and home runs. A team that has a lot of weak hitters in their lineup is more likely to use this strategy since runs will be at a premium.
I also alluded in that earlier post that big ball is the better strategy. Stolen bases actually have a negative correlation with runs scored whereas home runs, on-base percentage, and slugging have a very strong correlation with runs scored. One of the questions that may have come to mind if you read that post is “Don’t stolen bases improve a team’s chances of scoring runs? How come increasing the number of stolen bases for a team also decreases the number of expected runs for that team?”
In short, the reason for this is that a missed stolen base decreases expected runs scored. With a runner on first and nobody out, for example, a team can expect to score 0.941 runs per inning. If that runner successfully steals second base, the team has a runner on second and nobody out and can expect to score 1.170 runs. However, if they are caught stealing, the team has nobody on base and one out, and the run expectancy is down to 0.291 runs.
How often must a team successfully steal a base to break even? In other worse, how often must a team be successful in stealing a base to make it worth it? To research this, I used the chart on this website (http://www.tangotiger.net/re24.html) to determine run expectancy given different situations. I used the 1993-2010 matrix since that is the most relevant information on that website. Since stealing home almost never happens, I will not look at that and instead look at situations with runners on 1st base, 2nd base, and on both 1st and 2nd base. Here are the different scenarios (note: when I look at scenarios with runners on 1st and 2nd, I consider getting the lead runner out as being "caught stealing"):
Exp. Runs Stolen Base Caught Stealing
0 Out, 1st Base 0.941 1.170 0.291
0 Out, 2nd Base 1.170 1.433 0.291
0 Out, 1st & 2nd 1.556 2.050 0.721
1 Out, 1st Base 0.562 0.721 0.112
1 Out, 2nd Base 0.721 0.989 0.112
1 Out, 1st & 2nd 0.963 1.447 0.348
2 Out, 1st Base 0.245 0.348 0.000
2 Out, 2nd Base 0.348 0.385 0.000
2 Out, 1st & 2nd 0.471 0.626 0.000
The next step is to consider the net gain in expected runs when a stolen base is successful and the net loss in expected runs when a stolen base is unsuccessful:
SB, Net Gain CS, Net Loss
0 Out, 1st Base 0.229 (0.650)
0 Out, 2nd Base 0.263 (0.879)
0 Out, 1st & 2nd 0.494 (0.835)
1 Out, 1st Base 0.159 (0.450)
1 Out, 2nd Base 0.268 (0.609)
1 Out, 1st & 2nd 0.484 (0.615)
2 Out, 1st Base 0.103 (0.245)
2 Out, 2nd Base 0.037 (0.348)
2 Out, 1st & 2nd 0.155 (0.471)
Based on this information, we can determine how successful a stolen base attempt must be for a team to break even.
Break Even
Stolen Base %
0 Out, 1st Base 73.95%
0 Out, 2nd Base 76.97%
0 Out, 1st & 2nd 62.83%
1 Out, 1st Base 73.89%
1 Out, 2nd Base 69.44%
1 Out, 1st & 2nd 55.96%
2 Out, 1st Base 70.40%
2 Out, 2nd Base 90.39%
2 Out, 1st & 2nd 75.24%
In short, a team must be very successful at stealing bases to make it worth it. A 50% stolen base success ratio won't cut it. A 75% stolen base success ratio just barely cuts it. I don't have any hard numbers to back up how often each of the nine scenarios above come up. I'd argue, though, that the vast majority of stolen base attempts occur with a runner on 1st. The simple average necessary stolen base percentage for scenarios with runners on 1st is 72.74%. For simplicity purposes (but also since it is a reasonable ratio), we will determine that 72.74% is the magic ratio.
So how does this translate to real life baseball? To determine this, I have looked at the league leaders in stolen bases for each league for each year going back to 1980. I also took a simple average of the net gain for each stolen base when there is a runner on first (0.1637 runs) and a simple average of the net loss for each each caught stealing when there is a runner on first (-0.4483 runs). In that time, there have actually been four players (1981 Rickey Henderson, 1993 Chuck Carr, 1995 Quilvio Veras, and 2001 Juan Pierre) who have lead the league in stolen bases and have actually hurt their team with stolen base attempts. None of them materially hurt their team (Rickey Henderson cost his team 0.70 runs, Chuck Carr cost his team 0.37 runs, Quilvio Veras cost his team 0.25 runs, and Juan Pierre cost his team 0.09 runs), but we're talking about league leaders here. If you lead the league in stolen bases, one would expect the player to also add value to his team. No wonder Chucky hacked.
The vast majority of players, however, added runs for their team. How many runs did each player add? The answer is not much. Most baseball statistic gurus would argue that a player adds one win of value to a team when they add 10 runs to their team. Only one player, 1986 Vince Coleman, added over 10 runs for his team in a year by stealing bases (he stole 107 bases, got caught stealing 14 times; he added 11.24 runs for the team). After that, however, not a single player added a full win for their team. Rickey Henderson came closest in 1988 when he added 9.39 runs of value for his team. On average, league leading base stealers added about 4.39 runs for their team over the course of a year. For some players, this could be seen as a nice bonus. For example, Mike Trout had a spectacular offensive season in 2012. He also stole 49 bases and got caught 5 times, adding 5.78 runs of value for his team. Jose Reyes was on the list, Ichiro Suzuki was on the list, Carl Crawford was on the list, and Brian Roberts was on the list. For these players, they don't make a Major League career by stealing bases; it's just a nice little bonus.
For some players, however, their major asset is speed on the basepaths. Vince Coleman would have never been a Major Leaguer if it wasn't for his base stealing prowess. Tony Womack was a terrible player without his speed. Chone Figgins, Eric Young, Quilvio Veras, and Scott Podsednik weren't everyday players without their speed. The question that should really come to mind for these players is "Why were they everyday players?"
There are other ancillary reasons that a speedy player adds value to a team. They likely have more range in the field, they may be able to take an extra base on a hit, and may be able to run out a few ground balls for hits. However, let's look at Tony Womack in 1997. In 1997, Tony Womack led the National League with 60 stolen bases. He actually only got caught 7 times, so his success rate was about 90%. Because of his prowess on the basepaths, he added 6.68 runs for the team. Their other middle infielder for the team that year was Kevin Elster. He lost about 0.90 runs on the basepaths by stealing 0 bases and getting caught twice. However, he did get injured fairly early in the season and got replaced by Kevin Polcovich. In 1997, Polcovich stole 2 bases and got caught stealing twice. That is equal to about -0.57 runs. So, on the basepaths, here's how the three players ranked:
Tony Womack 6.68 runs
Kevin Polcovich -0.57 runs
Kevin Elster -0.90 runs
However, in 689 plate appearances in 1997, Womack hit 6 home runs. In 164 plate appearances in 1997, Elster hit 7 home runs. In 279 plate appearances in 1997, Polcovich hit 4 home runs. Extrapolating the home run total over 689 plate appearances may be unfair since it is unlikely Elster or Polcovich would have continued hitting home runs at that rate (if they had, Elster would have hit 29 home runs in 689 plate appearances and Polcovich would have hit about 10 home runs in 689 plate appearances). To be relatively conservative, let's say Elster would have hit 20 home runs in 689 plate appearances and that Polcovich would have hit 8 home runs in 689 plate appearances. A home run adds approximately 1.40 runs (source: http://www.tangotiger.net/runscreated.html); there is one automatic run since the player scores. There are also additional runs added for players on base, so in the end, it works out to about 1.40 runs.
In 689 plate appearances in 1997, Womack hit 6 home runs and added 8.4 runs for the team in that year. Think about that for a second. Tony Womack, one of the speediest and weakest hitters of all time, provided more runs for his team in 1997 with the long ball than with base stealing. If Elster had hit 20 home runs in 689 plate appearances in that same year, which is a very reasonable projection, he would have provided 28 runs for his team with the long ball. If Polcovich hit 8 home runs in 689 plate appearances in that same year, again a reasonable projection, he would have provided 11.20 runs for his team with the long ball. So here are the home run contributions for each player
Kevin Elster 28.00 runs
Kevin Polcovich 11.20 runs
Tony Womack 8.40 runs
When combined with base stealing statistics, here are the contributions for each player:
Kevin Elster 27.10 runs 2.71 wins
Tony Womack 15.08 runs 1.51 wins
Kevin Polcovich 10.63 runs 1.06 wins
When
it comes to on base percentage, they were essentially equal; Womack had
a .326 OBP, Elster had a .327 OBP, and Polcovich had a .350 OBP.
Womack was actually weakest in this category, and Polcovich was the
best. Using my Eq. run statistic, .024 OBP points is equivalent to 0.133 eq. runs / game. We have to divide this by 9 since the eq. run statistic assumes a team of 9 of the player instead of one of the players' run contributions. Then we multiply it by 155 games, which is the number of games Womack started in 1997. Polcovich added about 2.29 runs over Womack and Elster in OBP. That brings the difference down to about 2 runs, or about 0.2 wins over the course of a season, between Womack and Polcovich.
Here's the messed up thing; Womack, who was just barely better than a utility infielder on a below-.500 team, he was an all-star, he finished 9th in Rookie of the Year voting, and 24th in MVP voting. Polcovich didn't. He actually only played one more year in Major League Baseball, and it wasn't as a starter. Womack played until 2006, averaging under 4 home runs a year and with a .317 on-base percentage. He was just barely better than a utility infielder whose Major League career ended one year later in 1997 and he got worse over time. Again, it just shows how terribly inaccurate people who talk about winning with "small ball" is important.
In short, there is a negative correlation between stolen bases and runs scored because a runner caught stealing gives up more runs than a runner stealing a base gains. Even the best base stealers have a very minimal impact on a game, however. Only one league leading base stealer since 1980 (Vince Coleman) added a game's worth of value to his team.
SACRIFICE BUNTING
So we can come to the conclusion that stolen bases don't win many games. How about sacrifice bunting? A good small ball team has a lineup of players who can bunt. But is that smart?
The answer isn't an across-the-board "yes" but it also isn't an across-the board "no". In the first scenario I'll look at, I'll consider a situation with a runner on 1st and nobody out. In this situation, a team can expect to score 0.941 runs. An unsuccessful sacrifice bunt will leave a runner on first with one out, a situation that will decrease the expected run value to 0.562 runs. A successful sacrifice bunt, on the other hand, will decrease the expected run value to 0.721 runs. In addition, the best information I found stated that a sacrifice bunt works about 76% of the time. Taking that into account, a team with a runner on first and nobody out would expect to see its expected run value decrease from 0.941 runs to 0.683 runs if they decide to sacrifice bunt with the next batter up.
It doesn't sound great. Even if a sacrifice bunt works, the expected run value goes down. Why would any team do that? The answer is that having the next batter swing away could work against them. A player with a .000 OBP, for example, would always want to sacrifice bunt in that situation since 0.721 runs is still higher than 0.562 runs.
But how often would the next player up need to get on base to make it so refusing the sacrifice is a smart option? To determine this, we realize that having a runner on 1st and 2nd with 0 outs yields an expected 1.556 runs. Again, having a runner on 1st with 1 out yields an expected .562 runs. The equation I need to solve is 1.556x + .562(1-x) = .683, where x is the break-even on-base percentage. Solving this shows that a player with an OBP of above .122 should swing away in this situation. Obviously, the real answer isn't that simple; an extra base hit, a single where the runner takes 3rd, and a double play are possible when swinging away. For the sake of this calculation however, I will say that the prospects of getting more than a runner on first and second with one out, along with the prospect of a bunt double play, is offset by the prospect of a double play. Therefore, an OBP of about .122 sounds about right.
I ran a very similar analysis with the same situation but instead of having a runner on first with no outs, I have a runner on first with one out. The expected runs in this situation is 0.562. With an unsuccessful sacrifice bunt, the expected runs goes down to 0.245. With a successful sacrifice bunt, the expected runs goes down to 0.324. With a successful hit, the expected runs goes up to 0.963. Using all of these factors, I found that the break-even OBP is down to .110.
How about the suicide squeeze? There are a lot of situations where this comes up, but to keep this post from becoming even longer than it already is, I'm going to look only at a situation with a runner on 3rd and 0 outs and a runner on 3rd and 1 out. I am also going to assume that we are looking at a situation in a game where a pitcher will throw the ball to first if the bunt works to get the out. Finally, the best evidence I could find says that a suicide squeeze only works about 68% of the time.
A team with a runner on 3rd with nobody out can expect to score approximately 1.433 runs in that inning. A successful suicide squeeze will score 1 run and leave the bases empty with one out, which leaves a team with 1 sure run and a run expectation for the rest of the inning of 0.291 (for a total of 1.291 runs). An unsuccessful suicide squeeze will get the out at home but the batter will reach first. A team with a runner on 1st and one out can expect to score 0.562 runs. Using the 68% success ratio, a team that decides to use the suicide squeeze sees its expected runs decrease from 1.433 runs to 1.058 runs.
Playing big ball, a team will go for a hit. To be conservative, I'll say the only hit that will happen is a single to score the run and leave a runner on first. A team that gets a hit in this situation will see its expected runs go up from 1.433 runs to 1.941 runs. A team that doesn't get a hit would still have a runner on 3rd with one out, which would still yield about 0.989 runs. The break-even on-base percentage is .072. Most weak hitting pitchers will still have a higher on base percentage than that.
With a runner on 3rd and one out, however, the squeeze play becomes a lot more reasonable. With a runner on 3rd and one out, a team can expect to score .989 runs. An unsuccessful suicide squeeze will lower that to 0.245 runs and a successful suicide squeeze will actually increase it to 1.112 runs. A suicide squeeze attempt will still lower the expected runs to .834, but it's not a huge dropoff. A successful single will increase expected runs to 1.562. If a hitter only hits singles, he needs a batting average of about .381 to make it so that a suicide squeeze is not a good idea. However, this is certainly not all-encompassing. Most players won't have a .381 batting average or even a .381 on-base percentage, so it would seem that a suicide squeeze is the right decision most of the time. However, as a I stated above, a suicide squeeze attempt will still lower expected runs. If you include doubles, home runs, triples, errors, deep fly balls, soft ground balls, etc., swinging away will still be the right decision for the average hitter. Still, it would make sense to use the suicide squeeze with a below-average hitter.
But What If You Only Need One Run? Is Sacrifice Bunting Smart Then?
Obviously, there are situations where you are really going after one run. If you are down by one run late in a game or if you are tied late in a game, getting one run should be the goal, either to keep the game going, to take the lead late, or to win the game. Having a runner on 3rd with 0 outs may yield an average of 1.433 runs, but does anything beyond 1 really matter in that situation? I suppose it could, but for the sake of this argument, we will look at situations where only one run is needed.
First we will look at sacrificing with a runner on first. With a runner on first with 0 outs, a run will score about 44.1% of the time. An unsuccessful sacrifice bunt will lower that to 28.4% while a successful one will decrease it to 41.8%. Using the same ratio as above, a sacrifice bunt attempt will lower the odds of scoring a run from 44.1% to 38.6%. Having runners on 1st and 2nd with 0 outs, however, will increase the odds of scoring a run to 64.3%. Using these assumptions, a player needs a .284 OBP to break even. Outside of most pitchers and a few select everyday players, most players will have an OBP above .284 so forgoing a sacrifice bunt in this situation doesn't make sense.
With a runner on first with one out, a team can expect to score about 28.4% of the time. An unsuccessful sacrifice bunt will lower it to 13.5% while a successful sacrifice bunt will lower it to 23%. Therefore, a team that decides to sacrifice bunt with a runner on 1st and one out will lower their odds of scoring a run from 28.4% to 20.7%. Having runners on 1st and 2nd with one out will raise the odds of scoring a run to 42.9%.
The break even on base percentage in this scenario is then .244.
Now let's look at the suicide squeeze. With a runner on third and nobody out, a team can expect to score about 85.3% of the time. A successful suicide squeeze will increase that to 100%. An unsuccessful suicide squeeze will decrease it all the way to 28.4%. Going for the suicide squeeze in this scenario lowers the odds of scoring one run from 85.3% to 77.1%. A successful hit using big ball will score the run. An unsuccessful non-sacrifice at-bat will lower the odds of scoring one run to 67.4%. The break even batting average is .298, but also remember in this case that a long fly ball would produce the same result as a hit and a well-placed ground ball would produce the same result as a hit. So, I suppose instead of batting average, we could say that a formula of (hits + long fly balls + well placed ground balls) / at-bats would have to be .298.
With a runner on third and one out, a team can expect to score about 67.4% of the time. A successful squeeze will increase that to 100% and an unsuccessful suicide squeeze decreases it to 13.5%. That means that going for a suicide squeeze in this situation will actually increase the odds of scoring a run (100% x 68% success rate = 68%, which is already higher than 67.4%). Obviously, it's not as simple as that; the defense will play with the infield in. If the infield is in, the team will likely have to swing away no matter what, since a sacrifice bunt will almost never be successful.
In conclusion, small ball may sound nice in theory. However, in pretty much all cases, it costs more runs (by forgoing a curvy number and instead settling for 1) than it gains.
Saturday, February 23, 2013
Monday, February 18, 2013
Who Should be the Opening Day First Baseman for the Brewers?
Going into the 2013 season, the Milwaukee Brewers were supposed to be reasonably deep at first base. Starting would be slugger Corey Hart, who is capable of putting up a .270 batting average and 30 home runs per season while playing a decent first base. If something went wrong with him, it wouldn't be good, but the Brewers would have an internal option in Mat Gamel, who started the 2011 season as the starting first baseman with the Milwaukee Brewers.
Well, first the news came out that Corey Hart would be out until at least the end of April but more like until the middle or end of May with a knee injury. And then, on the first day of spring training for him, Mat Gamel re-aggravated his ACL injury from last year, which will likely keep him out of action for the entire 2013 season.
Now, the Brewers do not have a bona fide first baseman to start the year. For a while, it looked like a possibility that the Brewers would bring in Lyle Overbay to play first with Gamel until Hart came back. Well, Overbay signed with the Boston Red Sox, meaning the Brewers will have to look at other options.
I made a list of 9 potential opening day starters at first base for the Brewers. Included in this list are three players who were otherwise likely to at least have a shot to make the opening day roster for the Milwaukee Brewers this year: Taylor Green, Alex Gonzalez, and Bobby Crosby. I also included three minor league candidates who would otherwise be long shots to make the team: Hunter Morris, Sean Halton, and Khris Davis. Finally, I looked at three available free agents who may pique interest from the Brewers: Carlos Lee, Aubrey Huff, and Mike Carp.
Obviously, this is not a full list of candidates. Other candidates may include current Brewers like Martin Maldonado, other Minor League candidates like Erick Almonte or Caleb Gindl, other free agents like Derrek Lee, or even players who may be dropped by other teams, a group that could include names like Travis Ishikawa and Matt LaPorta.
However, I just looked at the nine players listed above. I researched the Eq. Run for each player in 2011 and 2012. If the player played a significant amount of time in the minor leagues, I used a Minor League equalizer (http://mlsplits.drivelinebaseball.com/mlsplits/mlecalc) to determine a Major League equivalent for each player. If the player spent time at different levels, I used a weighted average of their time at each level using plate appearances to come up with an overall stat. For Major League players, I also factored "luck" into the equation. I tried to do that by using an expected BABIP and adjusting OBP to that. That kind of information is hard to find for Minor League players, so luck is included in all of their stats.
Here is a table of what I came up with:
2011 2012
Taylor Green 5.542 3.521
Alex Gonzalez 3.177 4.974
Bobby Crosby 2.947 N/A
Hunter Morris 2.425 4.478
Sean Halton 3.518 4.086
Khris Davis 3.386 5.973
Carlos Lee 5.171 4.235
Aubrey Huff 3.781 4.587
Mike Carp 5.491 3.330
I also put together a bar graph to show how these players look comparatively:
Some of the options certainly look better than others. I will go one by one to list pros and cons to signing each of them:
Taylor Green - The Major League Favorite. Out of all the players currently on the Brewers, Taylor Green seems like the most likely option. He played first base a bit last year and was considered an option when Gamel got injured. However, he didn't really live up to expectations. He had an excellent year in AAA in 2011 and followed it up with an underwhelming call-up in the Majors. In 2012, he had an average year in AAA and would have likely stayed there all year if Gamel hadn't gotten injured last year. If he can put together a Major League season that resembles what he did in the Minors in 2011, he would be a great option. However, he has been disappointing as a Major League player. In addition, he has had a very up and down Minor League career; 2011 was a bit out of the ordinary for him.
Alex Gonzalez - The Shortstop Turned Utility Player. Alex Gonzalez was signed by the Brewers to be the starting shortstop last year. Shortstops are generally seen as better fielders and worse hitters than shortstops. As a matter of fact, it is almost a given that shortstop is the hardest position to play outside of catcher and that first base is the easiest position to play. Because of that, first basemen generally hit better than shortstops to make up for the lack of defense. Alex Gonzalez is a slightly light-hitting shortstop. He can hit for some power, but he has problems getting on base and he couldn't even find a starting shortstop offer after an injury sidelined him for most of the year last year. The chart above shows that he was good at the plate last year; however, that was about one month's worth of plate appearances, a very small sample size. In his most recent full year, he hit for approximately 3.18 eq. runs / game (i.e. a team of 9 Alex Gonzalezes would score about 3.18 runs per game). That is pretty bad, even for a shortstop. As a utility player, he is a very good option (better than Cesar Izturis for the Brewers last year). As a starting first baseman, he is not only well below average, he is well below "replacement level", which in essence means the Brewers could replace him with a player getting paid the league minimum and get more production.
Bobby Crosby - The Loooooooooooooong Shot. Bobby Crosby's career started very well. In 2004, Crosby hit for a .239/.319/.426 line, which translates to an equivalent run statistic of 4.541. It's not earth shattering, but it does show how a shortstop is held to a much lower offensive standard than first basemen. He won Rookie of the Year in the American League that year. Since then, it has been all downhill. I put him in the first group to make the groups even; however, it is unlikely he'd make the Brewers over Jean Segura, Alex Gonzalez, and Jeff Bianchi. However, he has been willing to try his luck at first base and has some experience over there. The biggest con for him is that he hasn't played Major League ball (or even Minor League Ball) since 2010, and even then, he was struggling mightily (2.947 equivalent runs in 2011). He's an extremely long shot to make the team, much less to be the starting first baseman to begin the year.
Hunter Morris - The First Baseman of the Future... Today? Of all of the Minor League options, Hunter Morris' name is the first one to pop up. Why not? He had a very good year in AA last year and is considered one of, if not the, best offensive prospects for the Brewers. There is a big issue for Hunter Morris: even with his good year last year, he had a very hard time getting on base. His Major League equivalent line in 2012 was .258/.297/.459. A .297 OBP is not good. He could really benefit from time in AAA ball. As of right now, he is likely the favorite to start opening day for the Brewers; however, he could benefit from some seasoning in AAA. Another issue is that Morris has been inconsistent. In 2011, with the Brevard County Manatees (A+ ball), he had an eq. runs line of 2.425 runs. His Major League equivalent line was .217/.236/.351, which is equivalent to a .587 OPS, which is unacceptable for any non-pitcher, especially a first baseman. Like Taylor Green, he only really has one good minor league year and even that year wasn't great (.756 eq. OPS, 4.478 eq. runs). If 2012 is an indicator that he has improved, he will likely be ready for the 1B job in 2014 (Corey Hart is a free agent after this year); if not, his ceiling is no higher than Taylor Green's.
Sean Halton - The Lower Ceiling Prospect. When a list of Brewers' prospects is made, the names at the top are mainly pitchers. You may also see a few hitters up there: Hunter Morris, Clint Coulter, Scooter Gennett, etc. However, one name that has not come up much is Sean Halton. Halton is an older prospect (he will be 26 years old this year), but he did put together a few decent years in AA and AAA the last two years. In 2011, Halton put together a Major League equivalent line of .255/.292/.368 with the Huntsville Stars. In 2012, Halton put together a Major League equivalent line of .240/.301/.412 with the Nashville Sounds. Really, that's pretty good. Unlike the other four candidates above, he has been fairly consistent the last two years (3.518 eq. runs in 2011, 4.086 eq. runs in 2012). No major flukey year, but no indicator that either of those two years were flukes. His ceiling is not nearly as high as Hunter Morris, but his floor also seems to be much higher. If I was the GM, I'd give him a lot of starts in Spring Training and consider him a top option for first base to begin the year.
Khris Davis - The Guy Nobody is Talking About. Very few people (essentially no non-die hard Brewers fans) are considering Khris Davis for this job. One reason is that he has not played first base in his career to date. Instead, he has played corner outfield. However, as I discussed above, first base is likely the easiest position to play in baseball and Davis very likely could pick it up so that he is only a minor liability in the field. However, his offense warrants a look this Spring Training. At the age of 23 with the Brevard County Manatees and the Huntsville Stars, he put together an eq. run statistic of 3.386. That doesn't sound great, but even a superb year in Brevard County will only equal a marginal year in MLB. Last year, he played with Huntsville and the Nashville Sounds, and put together a great season. With the Huntsville Stars, he put together a MLB equivalent line of .320/.388/.514 and with the Nashville Sounds, he put together a MLB equivalent line of .267/.350/.431 line; both are very good. Overall, he had a MLB equivalent eq. run statistic of 5.973 runs. Obviously, like everyone else, we need to take caution that this was only one year, even though his previous year wasn't bad. However, let's put this in perspective; let's look at the MLB equivalent eq. run statistic for Khris Davis in 2012 and compare it to Corey Hart:
Eq. Runs, 2012
Corey Hart 5.635
Khris Davis 5.973
Yes, by this stat, Khris Davis beat out Corey Hart in 2012 MLB equivalent eq. runs. Do I trust that to continue? Most likely no; like I said above, with minor league players, I can't "de-luck" statistics. He likely got very lucky in 2012 and had a high BABIP. Still, he's the guy I would have compete with Taylor Green and Sean Halton for the starting first base job this year. Beyond that, Mat Gamel was also expected to be the 5th outfielder for the Brewers this year. Davis should be considered for this role this year.
Carlos Lee - The Former Brewer. Carlos Lee played with the Milwaukee Brewers a while back. He was actually traded away from the Brewers, along with Nelson Cruz (editor's note: Why did you do that Doug Melvin?) for Kevin Mench, Francisco Cordero, and Laynce Nix. He then signed a lucrative long term deal with the Houston Astros, one of the many reasons the Astros are where they are today. He is now a shell of his former self. In 2011, with the Houston Astros, he put together an Adjusted (for BABIP) Equivalent Run statistic of 5.171, which is pretty good. In 2012, it went all the way down to 4.235. He was 36 years old in 2012; this is what happens with 36 year old players, especially those who don't condition that well. There is a distinct possibility that he could retire; there is also a possibility that he could be so bad this year that he may be dropped mid-year. The best that can be expected of Carlos Lee in 2013 is likely a line similar to his 2012 line. In addition, he would likely cost at least $1-2 million to bring in. In short, he is not a viable option, especially for a shortened role.
Mike Carp - The DFA First Baseman. While Carlos Lee is the most well known option, he is probably not the best fit for the Brewers. He's likely to be more expensive and may not be more than a designated hitter at this point of his career. Mike Carp, who was recently designated for assignment from the Mariners, is another option. He actually had a very good season in 2011 at age 25 with the Tacoma Rainiers and Seattle Mariners, putting together a Eq. Run statistic of 5.491. With Tacoma in 2011, Carp put together a MLB equivalent line of .307/.359/.549 (6.549 eq. runs) and he put together a line of .276/.326/.466 (4.642 eq. runs) with the Mariners. When combined, that is probably above average for a first baseman. He struggled mightily in 2012, however, putting a MLB equivalent eq. run against statistic of 3.33 between Seattle and Tacoma. Still, a 3.33 eq. run statistic is likely to be better than Gonzalez and Crosby, two players who didn't make it to the Majors as a first baseman. If he can put together a season somewhere in between his 2011 season and his 2012 season, he would be extremely serviceable as a replacement first baseman and as a backup the rest of the year.
Aubrey Huff - The Veteran Option. Aubrey Huff is probably on his last legs as a Major League player. He will be 36 years old this year and is no longer near a full time first baseman option. He has played with the San Francisco Giants each of the past two years and his stats have been somewhat underwhelming, especially for a first baseman. In 2011, he put together a line of .246/.306/.370, which is good for an eq. run statistic of 3.781. That is marginal for a first baseman. In 2012, he put together a line of .192/.326/.282. However, factored into the eq. run statistic I calculated is the fact his BABIP was extraordinarily well. When bringing his BABIP up to his 2011 level, his eq. run statistic was 4.587. That's still not average for a first baseman, but it's better than his 2011 eq. run statistic. Much like Lee, though, he would cost additional money ($1-$2 million, likely) and that is a deterrent to signing him. Again, like Lee, it would be foolish to expect anything more than 4.587 as an eq. run statistic in 2013; a 4.000 eq. run statistic should be considered more expected. It would be somewhere in between his 2011 statistics and 2012 statistics with a downgrade for his age. It would not be a great idea to sign him.
Based on all of this information, who should the Brewers start at first base to begin the year? Here is the order of the 9 guys I would go with:
Well, first the news came out that Corey Hart would be out until at least the end of April but more like until the middle or end of May with a knee injury. And then, on the first day of spring training for him, Mat Gamel re-aggravated his ACL injury from last year, which will likely keep him out of action for the entire 2013 season.
Now, the Brewers do not have a bona fide first baseman to start the year. For a while, it looked like a possibility that the Brewers would bring in Lyle Overbay to play first with Gamel until Hart came back. Well, Overbay signed with the Boston Red Sox, meaning the Brewers will have to look at other options.
I made a list of 9 potential opening day starters at first base for the Brewers. Included in this list are three players who were otherwise likely to at least have a shot to make the opening day roster for the Milwaukee Brewers this year: Taylor Green, Alex Gonzalez, and Bobby Crosby. I also included three minor league candidates who would otherwise be long shots to make the team: Hunter Morris, Sean Halton, and Khris Davis. Finally, I looked at three available free agents who may pique interest from the Brewers: Carlos Lee, Aubrey Huff, and Mike Carp.
Obviously, this is not a full list of candidates. Other candidates may include current Brewers like Martin Maldonado, other Minor League candidates like Erick Almonte or Caleb Gindl, other free agents like Derrek Lee, or even players who may be dropped by other teams, a group that could include names like Travis Ishikawa and Matt LaPorta.
However, I just looked at the nine players listed above. I researched the Eq. Run for each player in 2011 and 2012. If the player played a significant amount of time in the minor leagues, I used a Minor League equalizer (http://mlsplits.drivelinebaseball.com/mlsplits/mlecalc) to determine a Major League equivalent for each player. If the player spent time at different levels, I used a weighted average of their time at each level using plate appearances to come up with an overall stat. For Major League players, I also factored "luck" into the equation. I tried to do that by using an expected BABIP and adjusting OBP to that. That kind of information is hard to find for Minor League players, so luck is included in all of their stats.
Here is a table of what I came up with:
2011 2012
Taylor Green 5.542 3.521
Alex Gonzalez 3.177 4.974
Bobby Crosby 2.947 N/A
Hunter Morris 2.425 4.478
Sean Halton 3.518 4.086
Khris Davis 3.386 5.973
Carlos Lee 5.171 4.235
Aubrey Huff 3.781 4.587
Mike Carp 5.491 3.330
I also put together a bar graph to show how these players look comparatively:
Some of the options certainly look better than others. I will go one by one to list pros and cons to signing each of them:
Taylor Green - The Major League Favorite. Out of all the players currently on the Brewers, Taylor Green seems like the most likely option. He played first base a bit last year and was considered an option when Gamel got injured. However, he didn't really live up to expectations. He had an excellent year in AAA in 2011 and followed it up with an underwhelming call-up in the Majors. In 2012, he had an average year in AAA and would have likely stayed there all year if Gamel hadn't gotten injured last year. If he can put together a Major League season that resembles what he did in the Minors in 2011, he would be a great option. However, he has been disappointing as a Major League player. In addition, he has had a very up and down Minor League career; 2011 was a bit out of the ordinary for him.
Alex Gonzalez - The Shortstop Turned Utility Player. Alex Gonzalez was signed by the Brewers to be the starting shortstop last year. Shortstops are generally seen as better fielders and worse hitters than shortstops. As a matter of fact, it is almost a given that shortstop is the hardest position to play outside of catcher and that first base is the easiest position to play. Because of that, first basemen generally hit better than shortstops to make up for the lack of defense. Alex Gonzalez is a slightly light-hitting shortstop. He can hit for some power, but he has problems getting on base and he couldn't even find a starting shortstop offer after an injury sidelined him for most of the year last year. The chart above shows that he was good at the plate last year; however, that was about one month's worth of plate appearances, a very small sample size. In his most recent full year, he hit for approximately 3.18 eq. runs / game (i.e. a team of 9 Alex Gonzalezes would score about 3.18 runs per game). That is pretty bad, even for a shortstop. As a utility player, he is a very good option (better than Cesar Izturis for the Brewers last year). As a starting first baseman, he is not only well below average, he is well below "replacement level", which in essence means the Brewers could replace him with a player getting paid the league minimum and get more production.
Bobby Crosby - The Loooooooooooooong Shot. Bobby Crosby's career started very well. In 2004, Crosby hit for a .239/.319/.426 line, which translates to an equivalent run statistic of 4.541. It's not earth shattering, but it does show how a shortstop is held to a much lower offensive standard than first basemen. He won Rookie of the Year in the American League that year. Since then, it has been all downhill. I put him in the first group to make the groups even; however, it is unlikely he'd make the Brewers over Jean Segura, Alex Gonzalez, and Jeff Bianchi. However, he has been willing to try his luck at first base and has some experience over there. The biggest con for him is that he hasn't played Major League ball (or even Minor League Ball) since 2010, and even then, he was struggling mightily (2.947 equivalent runs in 2011). He's an extremely long shot to make the team, much less to be the starting first baseman to begin the year.
Hunter Morris - The First Baseman of the Future... Today? Of all of the Minor League options, Hunter Morris' name is the first one to pop up. Why not? He had a very good year in AA last year and is considered one of, if not the, best offensive prospects for the Brewers. There is a big issue for Hunter Morris: even with his good year last year, he had a very hard time getting on base. His Major League equivalent line in 2012 was .258/.297/.459. A .297 OBP is not good. He could really benefit from time in AAA ball. As of right now, he is likely the favorite to start opening day for the Brewers; however, he could benefit from some seasoning in AAA. Another issue is that Morris has been inconsistent. In 2011, with the Brevard County Manatees (A+ ball), he had an eq. runs line of 2.425 runs. His Major League equivalent line was .217/.236/.351, which is equivalent to a .587 OPS, which is unacceptable for any non-pitcher, especially a first baseman. Like Taylor Green, he only really has one good minor league year and even that year wasn't great (.756 eq. OPS, 4.478 eq. runs). If 2012 is an indicator that he has improved, he will likely be ready for the 1B job in 2014 (Corey Hart is a free agent after this year); if not, his ceiling is no higher than Taylor Green's.
Sean Halton - The Lower Ceiling Prospect. When a list of Brewers' prospects is made, the names at the top are mainly pitchers. You may also see a few hitters up there: Hunter Morris, Clint Coulter, Scooter Gennett, etc. However, one name that has not come up much is Sean Halton. Halton is an older prospect (he will be 26 years old this year), but he did put together a few decent years in AA and AAA the last two years. In 2011, Halton put together a Major League equivalent line of .255/.292/.368 with the Huntsville Stars. In 2012, Halton put together a Major League equivalent line of .240/.301/.412 with the Nashville Sounds. Really, that's pretty good. Unlike the other four candidates above, he has been fairly consistent the last two years (3.518 eq. runs in 2011, 4.086 eq. runs in 2012). No major flukey year, but no indicator that either of those two years were flukes. His ceiling is not nearly as high as Hunter Morris, but his floor also seems to be much higher. If I was the GM, I'd give him a lot of starts in Spring Training and consider him a top option for first base to begin the year.
Khris Davis - The Guy Nobody is Talking About. Very few people (essentially no non-die hard Brewers fans) are considering Khris Davis for this job. One reason is that he has not played first base in his career to date. Instead, he has played corner outfield. However, as I discussed above, first base is likely the easiest position to play in baseball and Davis very likely could pick it up so that he is only a minor liability in the field. However, his offense warrants a look this Spring Training. At the age of 23 with the Brevard County Manatees and the Huntsville Stars, he put together an eq. run statistic of 3.386. That doesn't sound great, but even a superb year in Brevard County will only equal a marginal year in MLB. Last year, he played with Huntsville and the Nashville Sounds, and put together a great season. With the Huntsville Stars, he put together a MLB equivalent line of .320/.388/.514 and with the Nashville Sounds, he put together a MLB equivalent line of .267/.350/.431 line; both are very good. Overall, he had a MLB equivalent eq. run statistic of 5.973 runs. Obviously, like everyone else, we need to take caution that this was only one year, even though his previous year wasn't bad. However, let's put this in perspective; let's look at the MLB equivalent eq. run statistic for Khris Davis in 2012 and compare it to Corey Hart:
Eq. Runs, 2012
Corey Hart 5.635
Khris Davis 5.973
Yes, by this stat, Khris Davis beat out Corey Hart in 2012 MLB equivalent eq. runs. Do I trust that to continue? Most likely no; like I said above, with minor league players, I can't "de-luck" statistics. He likely got very lucky in 2012 and had a high BABIP. Still, he's the guy I would have compete with Taylor Green and Sean Halton for the starting first base job this year. Beyond that, Mat Gamel was also expected to be the 5th outfielder for the Brewers this year. Davis should be considered for this role this year.
Carlos Lee - The Former Brewer. Carlos Lee played with the Milwaukee Brewers a while back. He was actually traded away from the Brewers, along with Nelson Cruz (editor's note: Why did you do that Doug Melvin?) for Kevin Mench, Francisco Cordero, and Laynce Nix. He then signed a lucrative long term deal with the Houston Astros, one of the many reasons the Astros are where they are today. He is now a shell of his former self. In 2011, with the Houston Astros, he put together an Adjusted (for BABIP) Equivalent Run statistic of 5.171, which is pretty good. In 2012, it went all the way down to 4.235. He was 36 years old in 2012; this is what happens with 36 year old players, especially those who don't condition that well. There is a distinct possibility that he could retire; there is also a possibility that he could be so bad this year that he may be dropped mid-year. The best that can be expected of Carlos Lee in 2013 is likely a line similar to his 2012 line. In addition, he would likely cost at least $1-2 million to bring in. In short, he is not a viable option, especially for a shortened role.
Mike Carp - The DFA First Baseman. While Carlos Lee is the most well known option, he is probably not the best fit for the Brewers. He's likely to be more expensive and may not be more than a designated hitter at this point of his career. Mike Carp, who was recently designated for assignment from the Mariners, is another option. He actually had a very good season in 2011 at age 25 with the Tacoma Rainiers and Seattle Mariners, putting together a Eq. Run statistic of 5.491. With Tacoma in 2011, Carp put together a MLB equivalent line of .307/.359/.549 (6.549 eq. runs) and he put together a line of .276/.326/.466 (4.642 eq. runs) with the Mariners. When combined, that is probably above average for a first baseman. He struggled mightily in 2012, however, putting a MLB equivalent eq. run against statistic of 3.33 between Seattle and Tacoma. Still, a 3.33 eq. run statistic is likely to be better than Gonzalez and Crosby, two players who didn't make it to the Majors as a first baseman. If he can put together a season somewhere in between his 2011 season and his 2012 season, he would be extremely serviceable as a replacement first baseman and as a backup the rest of the year.
Aubrey Huff - The Veteran Option. Aubrey Huff is probably on his last legs as a Major League player. He will be 36 years old this year and is no longer near a full time first baseman option. He has played with the San Francisco Giants each of the past two years and his stats have been somewhat underwhelming, especially for a first baseman. In 2011, he put together a line of .246/.306/.370, which is good for an eq. run statistic of 3.781. That is marginal for a first baseman. In 2012, he put together a line of .192/.326/.282. However, factored into the eq. run statistic I calculated is the fact his BABIP was extraordinarily well. When bringing his BABIP up to his 2011 level, his eq. run statistic was 4.587. That's still not average for a first baseman, but it's better than his 2011 eq. run statistic. Much like Lee, though, he would cost additional money ($1-$2 million, likely) and that is a deterrent to signing him. Again, like Lee, it would be foolish to expect anything more than 4.587 as an eq. run statistic in 2013; a 4.000 eq. run statistic should be considered more expected. It would be somewhere in between his 2011 statistics and 2012 statistics with a downgrade for his age. It would not be a great idea to sign him.
Based on all of this information, who should the Brewers start at first base to begin the year? Here is the order of the 9 guys I would go with:
- Taylor Green - While I feel that options #2 and #3 may be better options, it's not a bad idea to have somebody with some sort of MLB experience at the position. If Morris, Hunter, or Davis are called up and struggle, it's not a bad idea to have somebody who knows more what to expect to back him up and be ready to play, even if we can only expect 3.5-4.0 eq. runs from him.
- Khris Davis - The only thing keeping him from being #1 is that he has no Major League experience. Well, that and the fact that he hasn't played first base before. Still, his Minor League offensive statistics last year indicate that he would have been one of the better offensive options for the Brewers last year, even better than Corey Hart.
- Sean Halton - Again, he would be higher than Green if he had any decent Major League experience. Since he doesn't, he should have to compete with Khris Davis for the starting job at 1B for the Brewers in 2013. If Khris Davis reverts to 2011 form or if he proves to be a huge liability at first base in Spring Training (or in April), Halton should be given a good chance to start.
- Mike Carp - Of all the free agent options, Carp is the best for a few reasons. First, he is likely to be cheapest. Second, he has the highest ceiling since he will only be 27 years old in 2013. Finally, he has had the best season of any of the three free agent options listed in the last two years.
- Carlos Lee - At this point, we're getting to players I don't really want at all. He has some power left and his lack of conditioning (or effort in the field) will likely only be a small liability at first. Still, the money he would be owed is likely in the $1,000,000+ range and he may be so bad defensively now that he should be playing DH for some American League team.
- Aubrey Huff - Pretty much the same info I mentioned for Carlos Lee. He's getting up there in years, but he can still hit a bit and would only be a minor defensive liability in the field. His power is gone, but he has been getting on base a bit better in recent years.
- Hunter Morris - I just don't think he's ready for the Big Leagues. Give him another year and he very well may be. At this point, Halton and Davis are more ready and have more of a track record.
- Alex Gonzalez - As a utility infielder, he's definitely a plus. He can still field very well. But that's not something that should be considered strongly when choosing a starting first baseman.
- Bobby Crosby - The difference between Alex Gonzalez and Bobby Crosby is that Gonzalez should at least be a Major League utility player this year. Bobby Crosby has never had offensive stats that were good at first base and will likely be a Minor Leaguer for the vast majority of the year.
Saturday, February 16, 2013
Would It Be Smart To Sign Kyle Lohse?
The offseason is starting to wind up as most of the big name free agents have signed with their new teams. Zack Greinke is a Dodger. Josh Hamilton is an Angel. Michael Bourn is in Cleveland. B.J. Upton is in Atlanta.
One name that is notably not on a team at this point is Scott Boras client Kyle Lohse. The former St. Louis Cardinal pitcher is coming off a spectacular year. As a matter of fact, he finished 7th place in the National League Cy Young Award vote. His statistics were astonishing:
ERA: 2.86
WHIP: 1.090
Strikeouts: 143
Walks: 38
Those numbers indicate that he was an elite pitcher last year. An ERA of below 3.00 is spectacular. A WHIP of below 1.100 is spectacular. A strikeout - walk ratio of about 3:1 is pretty good (although I wouldn't call it spectacular).
He wasn't much different in 2011:
ERA: 3.39
WHIP: 1.168
Strikeouts: 111
Walks: 42
The numbers weren't quite as good in 2011 as they were in 2012, but they were solid. A 3.39 ERA is good for a top two spot in a rotation for most National League teams. His WHIP was very good and his strikeout-walk ratio was still pretty good.
Looking at his statistics over the last two years, he is probably the ace of a rotation. Prior to 2011, however, his statistics were considerably worse. Here are his stats from ages 22-31:
ERA: 4.79
WHIP: 1.431
Strikeouts: 984
Walks: 485
His ERA was the level of a #4 or 5 pitcher on most Major League teams, his WHIP was average to below average, and his strikeout-walk ratio was barely 2-1, which is barely passable.
So what happened? Did Kyle Lohse figure something out or did he get extremely lucky in 2011 and 2012?
The first thing I will do is look at his expected equivalent runs against throughout his career versus his actual runs against (basically ERA without errors taken into consideration). Here is a chart showing Kyle Lohse's actual runs against vs. the expected equivalent runs against:
From this chart, it certainly looks like Kyle Lohse underperformed his peripherals from age 22 through age 31. In his most extreme year, his age 31 year, one could expect his runs against to be about 5.00 but his actual runs against figure was about 7.40. However, in the last two years, he has outperformed his peripherals by about 0.5 runs each year. How can that be explained?
One possible explanation is that Kyle Lohse had a bad defense behind him. ERA is not a tell-all statistic. As I explained in a prior post, Yuniesky Betancourt had as many errors with the 2011 Brewers as Ozzie Smith had with the 1983 St. Louis Cardinals. However, Smith got to 1.39 more balls per game than Betancourt. If all 1.39 balls per game were an out for the 1983 Cardinals and a single for the 2011 Brewers, that would equate to more than one more run against per game.
Unfortunately, it is difficult to judge a team's defense in a given season. The 1.39 outs that Ozzie Smith got for the 1983 Cardinals were made up for on the 2011 Brewers. The 1.39 outs need to be made up somehow. Perhaps the next at-bat was a groundout to second base for the 2011 Brewers. This would have a -1.0 effect on Betancourt's range factor, but it would also have a +1.0 effect on Rickie Weeks' (or whoever was playing 2nd base) range factor. The net range factor for the team's defense would be 0.
I will use a statistic used by www.BaseballReference.com to look at the difference in defense from the 2010 Cardinals (Lohse's team when he underperformed his peripherals badly) to the 2012 Cardinals (Lohse's team when he overperformed his peripherals. The statistic is called Runs Above Average per 1,200 Innings:
2010 St. Louis Cardinals
Yadier Molina +17
Albert Pujols -3
Skip Schumaker -5
Brendan Ryan +14
David Freese +10
Matt Holliday 0
Colby Rasmus -12
Ryan Ludwick +16
Felipe Lopez -7
Jon Jay -7
Randy Winn -24
Aaron Miles -3
Nick Stavinoha -25
2012 St. Louis Cardinals
Yadier Molina +15
Allen Craig -6
Daniel Descalso -4
Rafael Furcal -9
David Freese +9
Matt Holliday -13
Jon Jay +10
Carlos Beltran -3
Matt Carpenter +1
Skip Schumaker -6
Tyler Greene -21
Shane Robinson -7
Tony Cruz +14
It certainly doesn't look like the 2012 Cardinals were significantly better at defense, if at all. While the 2010 Cardinals had a few players who were terrible defenders (Randy Winn and Nick Stavinoha), they were backups who didn't play all that much. In the meantime, they had Brendan Ryan (+14) and Ryan Ludwick (+16), players who were replaced by Rafael Furcal (-9) and Carlos Beltran (-3), respectively.
So it doesn't look like defense really played a major role in Kyle Lohse's improved statistics. The other two possible reasons Lohse's actual stats changed so much while his peripherals "only" changed about 1.25 runs per game are hard to separate from each other. Perhaps Kyle Lohse got very lucky. Or perhaps there is a such thing as a good contact pitcher (outside of the whole groundball / fly ball dynamic). There is actually a great stat to determine if one of these two things (or both) are happening. It is called BABIP (batting average of balls in play). It's bascially batting average with walks and home runs out of there. If the ball is in play and the defense is involved in a play, it's included.
Kyle Lohse's BABIP
2010: .369
2012: .267
I think we may have found something here. The league's average BABIP over Kyle Lohse's years as a player is about .297. An extremely high BABIP can be explained by a few things. The first is defense, but as we see above, that doesn't seem all that likely. The second is luck. A weak bloop fly ball to shallow left-center field that falls for a hit is not the pitcher's fault. A bunt single is not the pitcher's fault. A pitcher didn't "win" if a hard hit line drive is hit directly to the right fielder; he got lucky the defense was positioned well. Generally a high BABIP implies that the pitcher is likely better than his stats.
However, could it be possible that a player controls how a ball is hit? Can a pitcher be successful throwing fly balls by keeping all the fly balls on the infield? Can a pitcher be unsuccessful throwing ground balls if they are all scorching ground balls? I'm sure the answer is yes. Still, I'm hesitant to say that this is what is happening with Kyle Lohse. My reasoning for this is that a pitcher who can throw a pitch with good upward motion, the pitcher will likely be successful throwing fly balls. It would be something that wouldn't change wildly lover a career. A change in BABIP of over .102 in two years is ridiculously high. I tend to think the vast majority of his success in lowering BABIP over time is due to luck.
So, just looking at this, I'm saying signing Kyle Lohse is a bad idea; his success over the past two years is mainly due to luck and his next contract will likely be signed based more on his last two years than his prior 9. Still, though, it may be prudent to look at his career stats to date and see how a similar pitcher can be expected to progress in the following few years.
In my most recent post, I showed how different types of pitchers (strikeout pitchers (a.k.a. power pitchers), anti-walk pitchers (a.k.a. control pitchers), and ground ball pitchers (a.k.a. contact pitchers)) progress over a career. I weighted the group information I had on the prior post into an amount that matches Kyle Lohse's career stats:
Strikeout Percentage: 14.60%
Walk Percentage: 6.60%
Ground Ball / Fly ball Percentage: 0.72
Career Exp. Eq. Runs Against: 4.41
On the graph below, the thick blue line is Kyle Lohse's actual career progression. If we want to use his career Exp. Eq. RA statistic to project the rest of his career, follow the red line. If we want to use his strikeout percentage to project the rest of his career, follow the pink line. If we want to use walk percentage to project the rest of his career, follow the orange line. If we want to use groundball / fly ball percentage to project the rest of his career, follow the purple line:
First, the good news for Kyle Lohse. The individual statistic that seemed most consistent when determining a career projection was walk percentage. That is consistently lower than any other statistic until age 39. He maintains a 4.00 Exp. Eq. RA with that statistic until age 36 when there is an increase to the the 4.20 range. That is far better than his actual stats for most of his pre-2011 career, but it's still not great (think #3 type pitcher, #2 on a team that needs more pitching).
The bad news: none of these stats show an Expected Equivalent Runs Against statistic of better than 4.00 over the remainder of his career. His K%, GB/FB%, and overall Exp. Eq. RA statistic show a runs against statistic of closer to 4.30 in the next few years; probably not much better than a #3 or #4 for most good teams.
The big elephant in the room that also works against Lohse is that draft pick compensation is attached to him. If a team signs him at this point, that team loses their first round draft pick to the Cardinals. That is going to deter many teams from signing him, and the teams interested in him will take this into consideration when signing him. But is it worth giving up a 1st round draft pick and a potential ace in the future for a #3/#4 pitcher right now, even if you can get him at a discounted rate?
The question that this post looks to answer is "Would it be smart to sign Kyle Lohse?" Here is the information I came up with in this post:
One name that is notably not on a team at this point is Scott Boras client Kyle Lohse. The former St. Louis Cardinal pitcher is coming off a spectacular year. As a matter of fact, he finished 7th place in the National League Cy Young Award vote. His statistics were astonishing:
ERA: 2.86
WHIP: 1.090
Strikeouts: 143
Walks: 38
Those numbers indicate that he was an elite pitcher last year. An ERA of below 3.00 is spectacular. A WHIP of below 1.100 is spectacular. A strikeout - walk ratio of about 3:1 is pretty good (although I wouldn't call it spectacular).
He wasn't much different in 2011:
ERA: 3.39
WHIP: 1.168
Strikeouts: 111
Walks: 42
The numbers weren't quite as good in 2011 as they were in 2012, but they were solid. A 3.39 ERA is good for a top two spot in a rotation for most National League teams. His WHIP was very good and his strikeout-walk ratio was still pretty good.
Looking at his statistics over the last two years, he is probably the ace of a rotation. Prior to 2011, however, his statistics were considerably worse. Here are his stats from ages 22-31:
ERA: 4.79
WHIP: 1.431
Strikeouts: 984
Walks: 485
His ERA was the level of a #4 or 5 pitcher on most Major League teams, his WHIP was average to below average, and his strikeout-walk ratio was barely 2-1, which is barely passable.
So what happened? Did Kyle Lohse figure something out or did he get extremely lucky in 2011 and 2012?
The first thing I will do is look at his expected equivalent runs against throughout his career versus his actual runs against (basically ERA without errors taken into consideration). Here is a chart showing Kyle Lohse's actual runs against vs. the expected equivalent runs against:
One possible explanation is that Kyle Lohse had a bad defense behind him. ERA is not a tell-all statistic. As I explained in a prior post, Yuniesky Betancourt had as many errors with the 2011 Brewers as Ozzie Smith had with the 1983 St. Louis Cardinals. However, Smith got to 1.39 more balls per game than Betancourt. If all 1.39 balls per game were an out for the 1983 Cardinals and a single for the 2011 Brewers, that would equate to more than one more run against per game.
Unfortunately, it is difficult to judge a team's defense in a given season. The 1.39 outs that Ozzie Smith got for the 1983 Cardinals were made up for on the 2011 Brewers. The 1.39 outs need to be made up somehow. Perhaps the next at-bat was a groundout to second base for the 2011 Brewers. This would have a -1.0 effect on Betancourt's range factor, but it would also have a +1.0 effect on Rickie Weeks' (or whoever was playing 2nd base) range factor. The net range factor for the team's defense would be 0.
I will use a statistic used by www.BaseballReference.com to look at the difference in defense from the 2010 Cardinals (Lohse's team when he underperformed his peripherals badly) to the 2012 Cardinals (Lohse's team when he overperformed his peripherals. The statistic is called Runs Above Average per 1,200 Innings:
2010 St. Louis Cardinals
Yadier Molina +17
Albert Pujols -3
Skip Schumaker -5
Brendan Ryan +14
David Freese +10
Matt Holliday 0
Colby Rasmus -12
Ryan Ludwick +16
Felipe Lopez -7
Jon Jay -7
Randy Winn -24
Aaron Miles -3
Nick Stavinoha -25
2012 St. Louis Cardinals
Yadier Molina +15
Allen Craig -6
Daniel Descalso -4
Rafael Furcal -9
David Freese +9
Matt Holliday -13
Jon Jay +10
Carlos Beltran -3
Matt Carpenter +1
Skip Schumaker -6
Tyler Greene -21
Shane Robinson -7
Tony Cruz +14
It certainly doesn't look like the 2012 Cardinals were significantly better at defense, if at all. While the 2010 Cardinals had a few players who were terrible defenders (Randy Winn and Nick Stavinoha), they were backups who didn't play all that much. In the meantime, they had Brendan Ryan (+14) and Ryan Ludwick (+16), players who were replaced by Rafael Furcal (-9) and Carlos Beltran (-3), respectively.
So it doesn't look like defense really played a major role in Kyle Lohse's improved statistics. The other two possible reasons Lohse's actual stats changed so much while his peripherals "only" changed about 1.25 runs per game are hard to separate from each other. Perhaps Kyle Lohse got very lucky. Or perhaps there is a such thing as a good contact pitcher (outside of the whole groundball / fly ball dynamic). There is actually a great stat to determine if one of these two things (or both) are happening. It is called BABIP (batting average of balls in play). It's bascially batting average with walks and home runs out of there. If the ball is in play and the defense is involved in a play, it's included.
Kyle Lohse's BABIP
2010: .369
2012: .267
I think we may have found something here. The league's average BABIP over Kyle Lohse's years as a player is about .297. An extremely high BABIP can be explained by a few things. The first is defense, but as we see above, that doesn't seem all that likely. The second is luck. A weak bloop fly ball to shallow left-center field that falls for a hit is not the pitcher's fault. A bunt single is not the pitcher's fault. A pitcher didn't "win" if a hard hit line drive is hit directly to the right fielder; he got lucky the defense was positioned well. Generally a high BABIP implies that the pitcher is likely better than his stats.
However, could it be possible that a player controls how a ball is hit? Can a pitcher be successful throwing fly balls by keeping all the fly balls on the infield? Can a pitcher be unsuccessful throwing ground balls if they are all scorching ground balls? I'm sure the answer is yes. Still, I'm hesitant to say that this is what is happening with Kyle Lohse. My reasoning for this is that a pitcher who can throw a pitch with good upward motion, the pitcher will likely be successful throwing fly balls. It would be something that wouldn't change wildly lover a career. A change in BABIP of over .102 in two years is ridiculously high. I tend to think the vast majority of his success in lowering BABIP over time is due to luck.
So, just looking at this, I'm saying signing Kyle Lohse is a bad idea; his success over the past two years is mainly due to luck and his next contract will likely be signed based more on his last two years than his prior 9. Still, though, it may be prudent to look at his career stats to date and see how a similar pitcher can be expected to progress in the following few years.
In my most recent post, I showed how different types of pitchers (strikeout pitchers (a.k.a. power pitchers), anti-walk pitchers (a.k.a. control pitchers), and ground ball pitchers (a.k.a. contact pitchers)) progress over a career. I weighted the group information I had on the prior post into an amount that matches Kyle Lohse's career stats:
Strikeout Percentage: 14.60%
Walk Percentage: 6.60%
Ground Ball / Fly ball Percentage: 0.72
Career Exp. Eq. Runs Against: 4.41
On the graph below, the thick blue line is Kyle Lohse's actual career progression. If we want to use his career Exp. Eq. RA statistic to project the rest of his career, follow the red line. If we want to use his strikeout percentage to project the rest of his career, follow the pink line. If we want to use walk percentage to project the rest of his career, follow the orange line. If we want to use groundball / fly ball percentage to project the rest of his career, follow the purple line:
The bad news: none of these stats show an Expected Equivalent Runs Against statistic of better than 4.00 over the remainder of his career. His K%, GB/FB%, and overall Exp. Eq. RA statistic show a runs against statistic of closer to 4.30 in the next few years; probably not much better than a #3 or #4 for most good teams.
The big elephant in the room that also works against Lohse is that draft pick compensation is attached to him. If a team signs him at this point, that team loses their first round draft pick to the Cardinals. That is going to deter many teams from signing him, and the teams interested in him will take this into consideration when signing him. But is it worth giving up a 1st round draft pick and a potential ace in the future for a #3/#4 pitcher right now, even if you can get him at a discounted rate?
The question that this post looks to answer is "Would it be smart to sign Kyle Lohse?" Here is the information I came up with in this post:
- Kyle Lohse has underperformed his peripherals for most of his career.. but started to overperform them in 2011.
- There are three reasons this could be (defense, luck, actual pitcher's skill at contact pitching)
- Defense doesn't seem like a strong possibility; using a range-based defense stat, the 2010 Cardinals were at least as good as the 2012 Cardinals defensively and were likely better.
- Actual pitcher's skill at contact pitching may play an effect. However, a wildly volatile BABIP from 2010 to 2012 would indicate that Lohse consistently gets batters out using more unconvential means (i.e. getting a ton of players out with the pop fly, thus maintaining a low GB/FB ratio but making up for it by getting a higher percentage of flyballs out)
- That leaves luck, and luck runs out.
- Lohse's walk percentage gives a rosier outlook than the rest of his peripheral stats. It tells us to expect a 4.00 exp. eq. RA from Lohse over the next three years.
- Using strikeout percentage, groundball/flyball ratio, and overall exp. eq. RA, Lohse can expect about a 4.30 exp. eq. RA over the next three years.
- Lohse is also attached to draft pick compensation.
Thursday, February 14, 2013
How Do Different Types of Pitchers Age?
In prior posts, I have calculated a statistic that gives us a good idea of a way to determine how to judge a hitter's ability. I followed it up with an analysis of how hitters age in two different ways: elite vs. average and on-base vs. slugging. In another prior post, I have discussed the creation of a statistic to determine how to judge a pitcher's ability. Specifically, I look at three aspects of a pitcher that are essentially unaffected by anybody else. An elite defense can't stop a walk from being a walk or a fly ball from being a fly ball. Likewise, a terrible defense cannot both up a strikeout (with the immaterial occurrence of a dropped strike three, one of the weirdest baseball rules around). Now, I will look at how pitchers age. First, I will look at how elite pitchers age vs. average and some terrible pitchers. Then, I will look at the three individual aspects that are used in the Expected Runs Against statistic: strikeout percentage, walk percentage, and groundball / fly ball ratio.
First, I took a group of 72 pitchers who pitched in at least 14 of the 17 years between age 24 and age 40 who pitched a reasonable amount of innings each year (I used a soft floor of 25 IP, but 100 PA against was a hard floor). It's surprising that of every pitcher who pitched from 1995 - 2012, only 72 were eligible for this list (although I did eliminate pitchers who were strongly associated with PEDs: Roger Clemens, Andy Pettitte, Bartolo Colon. I may have missed a few, but I did take out those three for sure. I then took their career Expected Runs Against statistic to put them into three groups. Group 1 consists of players with the best Expected Runs Against and Group 3 consists of players with the worst Expected Runs Against. Here is a listing of each group:
Group 1 (Eq. RA of 3.16 - 4.23): Mariano Rivera, Greg Maddux, Kevin Brown, Billy Wagner, Derek Lowe, Pedro Martinez, Curt Schilling, Jon Lieber, Muke Mussina, Randy Johnson, Trevor Hoffman, John Smoltz, Orel Hershiser, Mike Timlin, David Wells, Rheal Cormier, John Franco, Rick Aguilera, John Burkett, Greg Swindell, Dennis Eckersley, Jimmy Key, Paul Assenmacher, Bob Wickman
Group 2 (Eq. RA of 4.27 - 4.67): Dennis Martinez, Mike Morgan, Terry Mulholland, Kevin Millwood, Rick Honeycutt, Dan Plesac, Scott Sanderson, Lee Smith, Buddy Groom, LaTroy Hawkins, Jamie Moyer, Tom Candiotti, Todd Jones, Alan Embree, Roberto Hernandez, David Cone, Norm Charlton, Tom Glavine, Danny Darwin, Mike Stanton, Tom Gordon, Michael Jackson, Guillermo Mota, Arthur Rhodes
Group 3 (Eq. RA of 4.68 - 5.59): Kenny Rogers, Chuck Finley, Livan Hernandez, Buddy Black, Woody Williams, Greg Harris, Aaron Sele, Darren Oliver, Mark Langston, Eddie Guardado, Steve Trachsel, David Weathers, Tim Belcher, Jesse Orosco, Tim Wakefield, Dave Burba, Jeff Nelson, Dennis Cook, Jamey Wright, Jose Mesa, Miguel Batista, Dave Stewart, Kent Mercker, Ron Villone
Basically, this is the control group. Here is a graph showing how these three groups do as they age over time:
.jpg)
Just a few things to notice from this group. First, there is a clear distinction between the three groups over time. The lines never cross, showing that elite pitchers don't explode at the end of their career or anything like that. The other thing to notice is that elite pitchers seem to peak between ages 29 and 32. Group 2 pitchers age a little later; ages 31-34 seem to be their best four years. Group 3, the average and mediocre pitchers, peak much later; ages 34-36 seem to be their peak years. Signing a 33 year old elite pitcher to a long term deal would, therefore, seem to be more risky than signing a 29 year old elite pitcher to a long term deal. However, for a group 3 pitcher, a signing at age 33 would be a better idea than signing the same pitcher at age 29.
The second statistic I will look at is career strikeout percentage. I separated the 72 pitchers into three groups based on career strikeout percentage. Group 1 has the best strikeout percentage, while group 3 has the lowest strikeout percentage.
Group 1 (19.10% - 33.20% K%): Billy Wagner, Randy Johnson, Pedro Martinez, Trevor Hoffman, Jeff Nelson, Curt Schilling, Lee Smith, Mariano Rivera, Arthur Rhodes, Dan Plesac, Paul Assenmacher, David Cone, John Smoltz, Jesse Orosco, Tom Gordon, Norm Charlton, Alan Embree, Roberto Hernandez, Michael Jackson, Eddie Guardado, Mark Langston, Mike Mussina, Guillermo Mota, Chuck Finley
Group 2 (15.30% - 19.10% K%): Rick Aguilera, Mike Stanton, Todd Jones, John Franco, Greg Harris, Dave Burba, Kevin Millwood, Ron Villone, Dennis Eckersley, Kevin Brown, Mike Timlin, Dennis Cook, Bob Wickman, Jon Lieber, Greg Swindell, Greg Maddux, David Weathers, Kent Mercker, Woody Williams, John Burkett, Tim Wakefield, Dave Stewart, David Wells, Danny Darwin
Group 3 (11.40% - 15.30% K%): Orel Hershiser, Jose Mesa, LaTroy Hawkins, Buddy Groom, Derek Lowe, Scott Sanderson, Tom Candiotti, Darren Oliver, Aaron Sele, Steve Trachsel, Rheal Cormier, Tim Belcher, Miguel Batista, Jimmy Key, Livan Hernandez, Jamie Moyer, Tom Glavine, Kenny Rogers, Dennis Martinez, Jamey Wright, Terry Mulholland, Buddy Black, Mike Morgan, Rick Honeycutt
And here is a graph showing how these three groups age over time:
.jpg)
High strikeout percentage seems to be a positive throughout a career, but it's certainly not the strongest of relations. While from age 26 to age 37, group 1 had the lowest expected runs against, it was somewhat inconsistent. In addition, groups 2 and 3 switched places very often. From age 27-30, group 3 pitchers, the group with the lowest strikeout percentage, fared better than group 2, the middle of the road strikeout percentage pitchers. So, while we can take a few things from this relationship, it's definitely not too strong.
Group 1 pitchers have a peak period from ages 31-32, with expected runs against being below 3.90. Group 2 pitchers are consistently fairly good from ages 30-38, with no particular peak period in that timeframe. Group 3 pitchers are all over the board. At age 33, they have an expected runs against of about 4.50. At age 34, it goes down to about 4.30. The difference between those two years for group 3 is higher than the variance between any two years from ages 30-38 for group 2 pitchers.
Signing a group 1 pitcher at age 33 would likely involve an overpayment, based on this information. Signing a group 2 pitcher at age 30 - 38 will likely at least give you some consistency, whereas signing a group 3 pitcher on the free agent market at any time is more risky than signing a group 2 pitcher. There are some years that group 3 is actually better than group 2, but there are some years that group 2 is significantly better. However, strikeout percentage doesn't seem to be a strong indicator of how a pitcher will do in coming years.
Next up, I look at walk percentage. Again, I separated the pitchers into 3 groups with group 1 having the lowest walk percentage and group 2 having the highest walk percentage.
Group 1 (4.50% - 7.20% BB%): Jon Lieber, Greg Maddux, David Wells, Curt Schilling, Mike Mussina, Greg Swindell, Dennis Eckersley, Mariano Rivera, Scott Sanderson, Terry Mulholland, Jimmy Key, John Burkett, Rheal Cormier, Rick Aguilera, Jamie Moyer, Kevin Brown, Pedro Martinez, Danny Darwin, Dennis Martinez, Derek Lowe, Trevor Hoffman, John Smoltz, Rick Honeycutt, Buddy Black
Group 2 (7.30% - 9.00 BB%): Kevin Millwood, Mike Timlin, Woody Williams, LaTroy Hawkins, Tom Candiotti, Orel Hershiser, Livan Hernandez, Mike Morgan, Tom Glavine, Buddy Groom, Kenny Rogers, Billy Wagner, Tim Belcher, Aaron Sele, Tim Wakefield, Paul Assenmacher, Darren Oliver, Eddie Guardado, Steve Trachsel, Randy Johnson, Mike Stanton, Alan Embree, Dan Plesac, Lee Smith
Group 3 (9.10% - 12.60% BB%): Dennis Cook, Dave Stewart, Guillermo Mota, David Cone, John Franco, Bob Wickman, Michael Jackson, Todd Jones, Jose Mesa, Chuck Finley, Dave Burba, David Weathers, Roberto Hernandez, Arthur Rhodes, Mark Langston, Miguel Batista, Greg Harris, Kent Mercker, Jesse Orosco, Norm Charlton, Tom Gordon, Jamey Wright, Ron Villone, Jeff Nelson
Here is a graph showing how these three groups fared over time:
.jpg)
Walk percentage appears to be a much better way to judge a pitcher's ability over time than strikeout percentage. Group 1 always has the lowest Expected RA and group 3 almost always has the highest Expected RA (and they always do after age 28, when most pitchers become free agents). Not only that, but Group 1 shows a significant improvement over group 2 and group 2 shows a very noticeable improvement over group 3. Signing a pitcher with a low walk percentage at pretty much any point in a pitcher's career will generally be a better idea than signing a pitcher with a high walk percentage.
Pitchers in group 1 appear to peak from ages 31-34 (although the Expected RA at age 33 takes an unexpected leap, ages 31, 32, and 34 are lower than the rest of the year; the age 33 jump can likely be attributed to statistical noise. Group 2 pitchers seem to peak from ages 34-36 and group 3 pitchers seem to peak from ages 29-32 (I'm attributing the drop in expected RA at age 35 to statistical noise). However, At any point over a pitcher's career, it seems preferable to sign a group 1 pitcher. Perhaps a good deal can be found on a group 2 pitcher in their mid-30s, but even then, a group 1 pitcher is preferable.
The final statistic to look at is Ground Ball / Fly Ball ratio. Again, I split the 72 pitchers into 3 groups:
Group 1 (0.86 - 1.62 GB / FB Ratio): Derek Lowe, Kevin Brown, Orel Hershiser, Mike Morgan, Greg Maddux, John Franco, Bob Wickman, Jamey Wright, Rick Honeycutt, Mike Timlin, Dennis Martinez, Mariano Rivera, Rheal Cormier, Todd Jones, Greg Harris, Buddy Groom, Miguel Batista, Terry Mulholland, David Weathers, Norm Charlton, Tom Gordon, Tom Glavine, Jon Lieber, Kenny Rogers
Group 2 (0.70 - 0.86 GB / FB Ratio): Roberto Hernandez, Tom Candiotti, John Burkett, Chuck Finley, LaTroy Hawkins, Jimmy Key, Darren Oliver, John Smoltz, Jeff Nelson, Mark Langston, Steve Trachsel, Paul Assenmacher, Aaron Sele, Jose Mesa, Mike Mussina, Buddy Black, Randy Johnson, David Wells, Jamie Moyer, Billy Wagner, Livan Hernandez, Curt Schilling, Kevin Millwood, Dave Burba
Group 3 (0.43 - 0.70 GB / FB Ratio): Pedro Martinez, Guillermo Mota, Michael Jackson, Arthur Rhodes, Mike Stanton, Rick Aguilera, Tim Belcher, Dan Plesac, Ron Villone, Kent Mercker, Tim Wakefield, Jesse Orosco, Alan Embree, David Cone, Lee Smith, Greg Swindell, Dave Stewart, Woody Williams, Danny Darwin, Scott Sanderson, Trevor Hoffman, Dennis Cook, Dennis Eckersley, Eddie Guardado
And here is the graph showing the relationship between age and expected runs against using GB / FB ratio
.jpg)
Wow, this looks like a mess. Group 1 is consistently better than the other two groups from ages 24 - 38. Groups 2 and 3 are close behind group 1, however, and like the strikeout percentage graph, group 3 and group 2 don't seem to tell us much. Group 2 sometimes has a significantly lower expected RA than group 3 and sometimes has a higher expected RA than group 2. In short, we may get some information from this graph, but the relationships don't look that strong.
Good ground ball - fly ball ratio pitchers don't seem to have a short peak; they seem to be consistently at their best from ages 29-35 with an expected run against stat of about 4.00. Group 2 pitchers seem to peak from ages 30-32 and then again from ages 34-36. Age 33 seems to be a bit of an outlier and is probably statistical noise. Group 3 pitchers seem to be at their best from ages 31 - 36 with a lull in the middle (ages 33-34). There doesn't seem to be much consistency for groups 2 and 3 when it comes to GB/FB ratio. GB/FB ratio is very consistent from ages 29-35 for group 1, but it doesn't really seem to be a significant difference from the rest of the group. Perhaps having a very good GB / FB ratio at age 29-32 may be something that could help a team determine if they want to sign a free agent long term, but it should not be the deciding factor.
So, in conclusion:
First, I took a group of 72 pitchers who pitched in at least 14 of the 17 years between age 24 and age 40 who pitched a reasonable amount of innings each year (I used a soft floor of 25 IP, but 100 PA against was a hard floor). It's surprising that of every pitcher who pitched from 1995 - 2012, only 72 were eligible for this list (although I did eliminate pitchers who were strongly associated with PEDs: Roger Clemens, Andy Pettitte, Bartolo Colon. I may have missed a few, but I did take out those three for sure. I then took their career Expected Runs Against statistic to put them into three groups. Group 1 consists of players with the best Expected Runs Against and Group 3 consists of players with the worst Expected Runs Against. Here is a listing of each group:
Group 1 (Eq. RA of 3.16 - 4.23): Mariano Rivera, Greg Maddux, Kevin Brown, Billy Wagner, Derek Lowe, Pedro Martinez, Curt Schilling, Jon Lieber, Muke Mussina, Randy Johnson, Trevor Hoffman, John Smoltz, Orel Hershiser, Mike Timlin, David Wells, Rheal Cormier, John Franco, Rick Aguilera, John Burkett, Greg Swindell, Dennis Eckersley, Jimmy Key, Paul Assenmacher, Bob Wickman
Group 2 (Eq. RA of 4.27 - 4.67): Dennis Martinez, Mike Morgan, Terry Mulholland, Kevin Millwood, Rick Honeycutt, Dan Plesac, Scott Sanderson, Lee Smith, Buddy Groom, LaTroy Hawkins, Jamie Moyer, Tom Candiotti, Todd Jones, Alan Embree, Roberto Hernandez, David Cone, Norm Charlton, Tom Glavine, Danny Darwin, Mike Stanton, Tom Gordon, Michael Jackson, Guillermo Mota, Arthur Rhodes
Group 3 (Eq. RA of 4.68 - 5.59): Kenny Rogers, Chuck Finley, Livan Hernandez, Buddy Black, Woody Williams, Greg Harris, Aaron Sele, Darren Oliver, Mark Langston, Eddie Guardado, Steve Trachsel, David Weathers, Tim Belcher, Jesse Orosco, Tim Wakefield, Dave Burba, Jeff Nelson, Dennis Cook, Jamey Wright, Jose Mesa, Miguel Batista, Dave Stewart, Kent Mercker, Ron Villone
Basically, this is the control group. Here is a graph showing how these three groups do as they age over time:
.jpg)
The second statistic I will look at is career strikeout percentage. I separated the 72 pitchers into three groups based on career strikeout percentage. Group 1 has the best strikeout percentage, while group 3 has the lowest strikeout percentage.
Group 1 (19.10% - 33.20% K%): Billy Wagner, Randy Johnson, Pedro Martinez, Trevor Hoffman, Jeff Nelson, Curt Schilling, Lee Smith, Mariano Rivera, Arthur Rhodes, Dan Plesac, Paul Assenmacher, David Cone, John Smoltz, Jesse Orosco, Tom Gordon, Norm Charlton, Alan Embree, Roberto Hernandez, Michael Jackson, Eddie Guardado, Mark Langston, Mike Mussina, Guillermo Mota, Chuck Finley
Group 2 (15.30% - 19.10% K%): Rick Aguilera, Mike Stanton, Todd Jones, John Franco, Greg Harris, Dave Burba, Kevin Millwood, Ron Villone, Dennis Eckersley, Kevin Brown, Mike Timlin, Dennis Cook, Bob Wickman, Jon Lieber, Greg Swindell, Greg Maddux, David Weathers, Kent Mercker, Woody Williams, John Burkett, Tim Wakefield, Dave Stewart, David Wells, Danny Darwin
Group 3 (11.40% - 15.30% K%): Orel Hershiser, Jose Mesa, LaTroy Hawkins, Buddy Groom, Derek Lowe, Scott Sanderson, Tom Candiotti, Darren Oliver, Aaron Sele, Steve Trachsel, Rheal Cormier, Tim Belcher, Miguel Batista, Jimmy Key, Livan Hernandez, Jamie Moyer, Tom Glavine, Kenny Rogers, Dennis Martinez, Jamey Wright, Terry Mulholland, Buddy Black, Mike Morgan, Rick Honeycutt
And here is a graph showing how these three groups age over time:
.jpg)
Group 1 pitchers have a peak period from ages 31-32, with expected runs against being below 3.90. Group 2 pitchers are consistently fairly good from ages 30-38, with no particular peak period in that timeframe. Group 3 pitchers are all over the board. At age 33, they have an expected runs against of about 4.50. At age 34, it goes down to about 4.30. The difference between those two years for group 3 is higher than the variance between any two years from ages 30-38 for group 2 pitchers.
Signing a group 1 pitcher at age 33 would likely involve an overpayment, based on this information. Signing a group 2 pitcher at age 30 - 38 will likely at least give you some consistency, whereas signing a group 3 pitcher on the free agent market at any time is more risky than signing a group 2 pitcher. There are some years that group 3 is actually better than group 2, but there are some years that group 2 is significantly better. However, strikeout percentage doesn't seem to be a strong indicator of how a pitcher will do in coming years.
Next up, I look at walk percentage. Again, I separated the pitchers into 3 groups with group 1 having the lowest walk percentage and group 2 having the highest walk percentage.
Group 1 (4.50% - 7.20% BB%): Jon Lieber, Greg Maddux, David Wells, Curt Schilling, Mike Mussina, Greg Swindell, Dennis Eckersley, Mariano Rivera, Scott Sanderson, Terry Mulholland, Jimmy Key, John Burkett, Rheal Cormier, Rick Aguilera, Jamie Moyer, Kevin Brown, Pedro Martinez, Danny Darwin, Dennis Martinez, Derek Lowe, Trevor Hoffman, John Smoltz, Rick Honeycutt, Buddy Black
Group 2 (7.30% - 9.00 BB%): Kevin Millwood, Mike Timlin, Woody Williams, LaTroy Hawkins, Tom Candiotti, Orel Hershiser, Livan Hernandez, Mike Morgan, Tom Glavine, Buddy Groom, Kenny Rogers, Billy Wagner, Tim Belcher, Aaron Sele, Tim Wakefield, Paul Assenmacher, Darren Oliver, Eddie Guardado, Steve Trachsel, Randy Johnson, Mike Stanton, Alan Embree, Dan Plesac, Lee Smith
Group 3 (9.10% - 12.60% BB%): Dennis Cook, Dave Stewart, Guillermo Mota, David Cone, John Franco, Bob Wickman, Michael Jackson, Todd Jones, Jose Mesa, Chuck Finley, Dave Burba, David Weathers, Roberto Hernandez, Arthur Rhodes, Mark Langston, Miguel Batista, Greg Harris, Kent Mercker, Jesse Orosco, Norm Charlton, Tom Gordon, Jamey Wright, Ron Villone, Jeff Nelson
Here is a graph showing how these three groups fared over time:
.jpg)
Pitchers in group 1 appear to peak from ages 31-34 (although the Expected RA at age 33 takes an unexpected leap, ages 31, 32, and 34 are lower than the rest of the year; the age 33 jump can likely be attributed to statistical noise. Group 2 pitchers seem to peak from ages 34-36 and group 3 pitchers seem to peak from ages 29-32 (I'm attributing the drop in expected RA at age 35 to statistical noise). However, At any point over a pitcher's career, it seems preferable to sign a group 1 pitcher. Perhaps a good deal can be found on a group 2 pitcher in their mid-30s, but even then, a group 1 pitcher is preferable.
The final statistic to look at is Ground Ball / Fly Ball ratio. Again, I split the 72 pitchers into 3 groups:
Group 1 (0.86 - 1.62 GB / FB Ratio): Derek Lowe, Kevin Brown, Orel Hershiser, Mike Morgan, Greg Maddux, John Franco, Bob Wickman, Jamey Wright, Rick Honeycutt, Mike Timlin, Dennis Martinez, Mariano Rivera, Rheal Cormier, Todd Jones, Greg Harris, Buddy Groom, Miguel Batista, Terry Mulholland, David Weathers, Norm Charlton, Tom Gordon, Tom Glavine, Jon Lieber, Kenny Rogers
Group 2 (0.70 - 0.86 GB / FB Ratio): Roberto Hernandez, Tom Candiotti, John Burkett, Chuck Finley, LaTroy Hawkins, Jimmy Key, Darren Oliver, John Smoltz, Jeff Nelson, Mark Langston, Steve Trachsel, Paul Assenmacher, Aaron Sele, Jose Mesa, Mike Mussina, Buddy Black, Randy Johnson, David Wells, Jamie Moyer, Billy Wagner, Livan Hernandez, Curt Schilling, Kevin Millwood, Dave Burba
Group 3 (0.43 - 0.70 GB / FB Ratio): Pedro Martinez, Guillermo Mota, Michael Jackson, Arthur Rhodes, Mike Stanton, Rick Aguilera, Tim Belcher, Dan Plesac, Ron Villone, Kent Mercker, Tim Wakefield, Jesse Orosco, Alan Embree, David Cone, Lee Smith, Greg Swindell, Dave Stewart, Woody Williams, Danny Darwin, Scott Sanderson, Trevor Hoffman, Dennis Cook, Dennis Eckersley, Eddie Guardado
And here is the graph showing the relationship between age and expected runs against using GB / FB ratio
.jpg)
Good ground ball - fly ball ratio pitchers don't seem to have a short peak; they seem to be consistently at their best from ages 29-35 with an expected run against stat of about 4.00. Group 2 pitchers seem to peak from ages 30-32 and then again from ages 34-36. Age 33 seems to be a bit of an outlier and is probably statistical noise. Group 3 pitchers seem to be at their best from ages 31 - 36 with a lull in the middle (ages 33-34). There doesn't seem to be much consistency for groups 2 and 3 when it comes to GB/FB ratio. GB/FB ratio is very consistent from ages 29-35 for group 1, but it doesn't really seem to be a significant difference from the rest of the group. Perhaps having a very good GB / FB ratio at age 29-32 may be something that could help a team determine if they want to sign a free agent long term, but it should not be the deciding factor.
So, in conclusion:
- When looking at the three major categories of stats that only the pitcher controls, walk percentage is by far the best in determining how good a pitcher is. Not only are the best pitchers in that category consistently good, but they are also significantly better than the other groups. At any time over a pitcher's career, walk percentage should be a top consideration when signing a free agent pitcher long term.
- Strikeout percentage and groundball / flyball ratio may tell us some, and the best of the best in these groups are better than the middle of the road and the mediocre pitchers in these statistics. Still, using these ratios to determine whether signing a pitcher long term is very risky.
- Better pitchers also seem to peak earlier (in their late 20s and early 30s) as opposed to average pitchers, who peak in their mid and ever upper 30s.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)